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REPLY BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER 
INTRODUCTION 
 Because of the significant constitutional issues 
raised and the crippling uncertainty faced by the 
country until those issues are resolved, Virginia 
seeks, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules of this Court, 
to expedite resolution of its challenge to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”). 
The Secretary’s opposition to Virginia’s Petition is 
largely based on a misapprehension of the scope of 
the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, Va. Code 
§ 38.2-3430.1:1, and on a failure to recognize the 
significant damage that delaying final resolution of 
the questions will inflict upon States and others. 
 Contrary to the Secretary’s argument, it is not 
true that “[t]he Virginia General Assembly enacted a 
statute declaring that its residents do not have to 
comply with a provision of ” PPACA. (Br. in Opp’n. at 
2). The Virginia enactment was passed at a time 
when no one could say whether a federal health care 
law would pass both houses of Congress. The Virginia 
Health Care Freedom Act exercises Virginia’s 
reserved police powers to provide that no citizen of 
Virginia is required to purchase a policy of health 
insurance. Although the law contains a few narrow 
exceptions, it is a statute of general application, 
covering other entities such as employers and local 
governments. It is well established in this Court and 
in the circuit courts of appeals that the United States 
and the States have sovereign standing to defend 
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their laws. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the district 
court found that Virginia had standing to seek and 
obtain a declaration that Congress exceeded its 
enumerated powers in enacting PPACA. (App. at 50).  
 Since the filing of the Petition, the governors of 
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming have written to the 
President, reporting that every state faces significant 
challenges and expenses in implementing PPACA 
over the next several years and requesting his 
agreement to expedited review. http://www.governor. 
virginia.gov/News/docs/Governors%20Lawsuit%20Letter.
pdf. In particular, these 28 governors addressed the 
overhang of uncertainty:  
Given the daunting and costly financial and 
regulatory burdens that our states and the 
private sector will face in implementing 
PPACA over the coming years, particularly 
during this unprecedented budgetary time, 
public interest requires expediting a final 
resolution of the litigation to give certainty 
as soon as possible. We should not endure 
years of litigation in the circuit courts, 
when the Supreme Court can promptly 
provide finality. This resolution can help 
prevent the states and the private sector 
from undertaking potentially unnecessary 
measures and expenses. More importantly, 
3 
our businesses, health care providers, and 
citizens of our great nation need to know as 
soon as possible whether all or part of the 
law will be upheld or stricken, so they know 
their options and obligations.  
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT  
 Rule 11 of the Rules of this Court provides that a 
petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment “will 
be granted only upon a showing that the case is of 
such imperative public importance as to justify 
deviation from normal appellate practice and to 
require immediate determination in this Court.” The 
Secretary concedes that “[t]he constitutionality of the 
minimum coverage provision is undoubtedly an issue 
of great public importance.” (Br. in Opp’n at 12). 
But she questions whether this is “one of the rare 
cases that justifies ‘deviation from normal appellate 
practice’ and ‘require[s] immediate determination in 
this Court.’ ” (Id.)  
 If this case does not satisfy that standard, it is 
difficult to see what case ever could. The issue is a 
pure question of law. Every district court that 
has reached the merits has rejected or declined 
to rule on the Secretary’s taxing power argument 
while concluding that the claimed power under the 
Commerce Clause is novel or unprecedented. Mead v. 
Holder, No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 U.S. Dist., LEXIS 
18592, at *55, *70-71 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Virginia 
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 
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(E.D. Va. 2010) (App. 29, 44-46); Thomas More Law 
Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893, 895 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010); Florida v. United States Department of 
Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 
1143-44, 1163 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Liberty University, 
Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 U.S. 
Dist., LEXIS 125922 *30-*37, *48-*49 (W.D. Va. Nov. 
30, 2010). Because PPACA cannot be upheld unless 
the cases of this Court marking the affirmative and 
negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause are 
extended, only this Court can definitively resolve that 
question. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American 
Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  
 As a matter of timing, the Secretary argues that 
at least one of the cases pending in the circuit courts 
of appeals will possibly reach this Court next term in 
the ordinary course. (Br. in Opp’n at 14). But this 
overlooks the desirability of using Rule 11 as it was 
used in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), to 
ensure that a significant constitutional issue is heard 
on the broadest available record. 
 The Secretary professes to see no evidence of how 
Virginia is being burdened because it has not yet 
spent new, appropriated state funds. (Br. in Opp’n 
at 15-16). This, of course, is inconsistent with 
the Secretary’s position in the Northern District of 
Florida where she sought clarification from the 
district court based upon “ ‘the variety of statutory 
provisions that would be subject to disruption if . . . 
the declaratory judgment was anticipated to operate 
as an immediate injunction with respect to the 
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programs currently in effect.’ ” Defs’ Mot. to Clarify 
at 9-13, Florida, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 3:10- 
cv-00091), Doc. 156. A significant number of the 
examples given in her motion by the Secretary 
involved states. Id. (See also Amicus Br. of Ass’n of 
American Physicians & Surgeons at 4). Furthermore, 
the entire nation is and will continue to be affected by 
uncertainty. That some private actors are suffering 
immediate harm has been conceded by the Secretary 
through her abandonment of standing challenges to 
individual plaintiffs in pending appeals. Mot. to 
Clarify, supra, at 14-15. (See also Amicus Br. of 
Physician Hospitals of America at 2-3).  
 The paradigm for a Rule 11 grant involves a 
constitutional challenge to federal action joined with 
national economic impact. PPACA is frequently 
described as an undertaking to regulate one-sixth of 
the American economy. The Secretary’s argument, 
that constitutional challenges to such a sweeping 
legislative reordering of American life, is not of 
comparable importance to the industries, economic 
impact, and employment affects in New Haven 
Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392 (1970); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); 
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 
(1947); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); 
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 
U.S. 330 (1935), is extravagant. The national impact 
of resolving PPACA piecemeal over a period of years 
dwarfs the impact threatened by the potential delay 
in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).  
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 The Secretary’s argument that this case does 
not present a good vehicle for resolving the 
constitutionality of PPACA on the merits because 
of questions about Virginia’s standing begins with 
a strawman. Virginia, throughout this case, has 
renounced any reliance on proprietary, parens patriae 
or any other form of quasi-sovereign standing. (App. 
at 58-60); Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 
22-28, Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (No. 3:10-cv-
00188), Doc. 28. This makes the Secretary’s discussion 
of these matters quite beside the point. (Br. in Opp’n 
at 19-22). 
 The Secretary’s standing argument also depends 
upon a misconstruction of the scope, reach and effect 
of the Virginia statute. The statement that “the 
statute exempts entities other than the federal 
government” (Br. in Opp’n at 20) is narrowly and 
literally true in the sense that there are a few 
exceptions. But it is clearly a statute of general 
application applying broadly to employers and local 
governments as Virginia argued in the district court. 
(Tr. of July 1, 2010 at 47-53, Sebelius, Doc. 81). This 
renders the statement that “petitioner has not 
suggested that the statute serves any other function 
other than as an effort to create standing” (Br. 
in Opp’n at 20) not merely unsupported by the 
record but contrary to it. Nor does it matter that 
the Virginia law has no separate enforcement 
mechanism. That is true of Federal statutes as well. 
See e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 7; 8 U.S.C. § 1623; 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C. And nothing would prevent the Attorney 
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General from enforcing the law against a locality. 
Furthermore, any citizen would have a private cause 
of action if discharged from employment contrary to 
its terms. Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 559 S.E.2d 
709 (Va. 2002).  
 Only on the next to last page of her brief does the 
Secretary even discuss the true doctrinal basis for 
Virginia’s standing: sovereign standing based upon 
the sovereign injury of having to give way with 
respect to its code of laws if the federal law is valid. 
(Br. in Opp’n at 21). There the Secretary concedes: “A 
State likewise may challenge a measure that 
commands the State itself to take action, e.g., New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (federal 
law required state to take title to nuclear waste 
or enact federally approved regulations), or that 
prohibits specified state action, e.g., Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (federal law prohibited 
States from using literacy tests or durational 
residency requirements in elections).”  
 The ipse dixit assertion that this case “has 
none of those features” is simply incorrect. As 
demonstrated in the Petition, the sovereign 
standing of a state to defend its code of laws is 
well established in this Court and in the federal 
circuits. (Pet. at 7-8). Sovereign standing has 
also been successfully claimed by the federal 
government. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources 
v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) (“It 
is beyond doubt that the complainant asserts an 
injury to the United States – both the injury to its 
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sovereignty arising from the violation of its laws . . . 
and the proprietary injury. . . .”); Stauffer v. Brooks 
Brothers, Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(sovereign injury “is a sufficient injury in fact”). If 
sovereign standing runs in favor of the United States, 
there is no principled reason why it does not run in 
favor of the joint sovereign, Virginia. Accordingly, 
Virginia has standing, and the Secretary’s argument 
that Certiorari should be denied on that basis fails.  
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The petition for a writ of certiorari before 
judgment should be granted.  
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